Publications

[2019]: "Geometry, Fields, and Spacetime," British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 70, pp. 1097–1117. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axy002

I present an argument against a relational theory of spacetime that regards spacetime as a "structural quality of the field."  The argument takes the form of a trilemma. To make the argument, I consider a general relativistic world in which there exist just two fields, an electromagnetic field and a gravitational field.  Then there are three options: either spacetime is a structural quality of each field separately, both fields together, or one field but not the other.  I argue that the first option founders on a problem of geometric coordination and that the second and third options collapse into substantivalism.  In particular, on the third option it becomes  clear that the relationalist's path to Leibniz equivalence is no simpler or more straightforward than the substantivalist's.

[2017]: "On the Viability of Galilean Relationalism," British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 68, pp. 1183–1204. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axw002

I explore the viability of a Galilean relational theory of spacetime---a theory that includes among its stock of basic relations a three-place collinearity relation. Two formal results are established. First, I prove the existence of a class of dynamically possible models of Newtonian mechanics in which collinearity is uninstantiated. Second, I prove that the dynamical properties of Newtonian systems fail to supervene on their Galilean relations. On the basis of these two results, I argue that Galilean relational spacetime is too weak of a structure to support a relational interpretation of classical mechanics.

[2016]: “Physical Geometry.” Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Massachusetts, Amherst. https://doi.org/10.7275/8441359.0

How is spacetime structure instantiated in the physical world? Consider that there’s no question what it means for a mathematical space to be flat or curved, bound or unbound, discrete or continuous. But what could it mean for the physical world to be structured in these kinds of ways? Call this the “problem of physical geometry.” To solve the problem is to provide fundamental truth conditions for propositions concerning the geometry of the physical world. I argue that only a substantival theory of spacetime—a theory according to which spacetime is an entity in its own right—can supply a satisfactory solution.

In Progress

“Explaining Symmetries”

“Explanation and Dependence”

"Bundles, Metrics, and Indiscernibles" 

Lots more. Seemingly forever in progress…